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Herein, a novel approach to conduct peer‐to‐peer energy auctions for electric vehicles
(EVs) to benefit both buyers and sellers is presented. It considers a scenario where
households can sell their surplus solar energy to visiting EVs that make use of the house-
holds' vacant charge points during the day. The aim of the energy trading is to maximise the
amount of charge EVs receive from the solar energy, and increase the revenue for sellers.
The novel Closest EnergyMatching (CEM) double auctionmechanism is proposed and it is
comparedwith four other mechanisms. CEMallows the auction to take into account current
energy requests as well as the potential future demand without requiring additional infor-
mation. Anovel algorithm,MARMES (MAtrix Ranking forMaximisingElement Selection),
is also presented to solve the optimisation problem that forms the basis of the CEM
mechanism. The CEM mechanism on average results in 21.5% more solar energy used,
lower cost to the consumer, a 24.9% increase in profits for sellers and a 71.4% reduction in
required grid energy compared with the traditional double auction mechanism.
1 | INTRODUCTION
The electric vehicle (EV) revolution is gathering pace, and
technology and infrastructure development must adapt
quickly to keep up. The availability of charging points and
EV range are still among customers' top concerns [1]; as of
May 2020, there are approximately 18,000 public charge
points available across the UK, however, many of these are
'slow' and provide insufficient range from short charges, or
often suffer technical issues and are out of service [2].
Around 80% of EV charging takes place at home, with
approximately 90% of EV owners having access to a private
charge point [3,4]. These charge points are often vacant
during the day and there is an emerging market for EVs to
utilise them, solving many issues that EV drivers currently
face. As existing public chargers cannot be booked, intro-
ducing a reservation system for private charge points would
alleviate EV owners' concerns over charge‐point availability,
especially when travelling to a new location. In addition,
private charge points could provide parking for visiting EVs,
thus helping to reduce parking and congestion difficulties
and guarantee charging.
The surge in EV numbers is creating new challenges for
power networks and energy systems, which must support the
ever‐increasing demand. The industry is undergoing rapid
evolution, with increasing use of distributed energy resources
(DERs) such as solar photovoltaic (PV) panels and private
energy storage, as well as the creation of smart grids and
additional load from EVs [5]. Peer‐to‐peer (P2P) energy
trading is emerging as a key technology for power networks
and smart grids [6–15] as it facilitates the trading of smaller
quantities of intermittent renewable energy among a local grid,
whilst avoiding many of the challenges of selling energy back
to the main grid. A common issue addressed through P2P
trading is the economic dispatch [8,9], where the trading of
energy is used in conjunction with the control of loads and
generation to minimise overall cost for a micro or smart grid.
P2P trading can result in economic benefits for energy pro-
sumers (i.e. households that are both consumers and producers
of energy). For instance, while E.ON Energy offer just 3 pence
per kWh (p/kWh) to purchase energy from producers through
a Smart Export Guarantee (SEG), compared with their stan-
dard selling rate to consumers of 16.5 p/kWh [16], a P2P trade
can be agreed at a price that is beneficial to both parties.
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P2P trading can be conducted in a centralised (e.g. [8,17])
or distributed [6,7,18–20] procedure. Wang et al. [8] develop a
centralised blockchain‐based approach to P2P trading, where
sellers and buyers send energy supply or demand requests for
day‐ahead trading to the utility, which then solves an optimal
power flow problem to minimise the generator cost function.
A real‐time optimisation is also used to balance out fluctua-
tions and forecast errors. Smart contracts are implemented by
the utility to control the energy trades. In [17], the ECO‐Trade
algorithm is presented to coordinate P2P energy trading
among households to solve an energy cost optimisation
problem whilst ensuring fairness amongst participants. A
Stackelberg Game approach is considered by [6,7,18] to co-
ordinate P2P trading in a distributed manner. In [7], buyers and
sellers in a community microgrid act on non‐cooperative and
Stackelberg Game frameworks to select the trade to maximise
their welfare, with buyers iteratively selecting a seller to trade
with based on submitted energy costs. A distributed iterative
algorithm is used to achieve equilibrium in the game. Liu et al.
[6] consider a microgrid operator (MGO) which optimises
energy sharing between solar PV prosumers. The MGO sets
internal prices for energy trading, and prosumers act as fol-
lowers to determine their energy consumption. Prosumers and
the MGO choose strategies to maximise profit for the MGO
and utility for prosumers. The authors of [18] also consider a
game theory relationship between microgrids for distributed
P2P trading. An iterative non‐cooperative game is played
among the energy sellers as they attempt to maximise their
profits by selling energy to buyers. The relationship between
buyers and sellers is then modelled as a Stackelberg Game to
achieve equilibrium to determine the optimal pairing of buyers
and sellers, and quantity of energy sold by the sellers. A con-
tract‐based approach for energy trading is considered in [19].
Forward and real‐time markets are considered, where agents
can buy and sell energy contracts in the forward market based
on predictions of cost and demand, the agents must then meet
their obligations in the real‐time market. At each iteration of
the market, each agent is offered a set of contracts by its
neighbours. The objective of the market is to ensure that the
agents choose a set of contracts that they do not wish to alter,
through a distributed price adjustment process. Khorasany
et al. [20] present a distributed approach to maximise the
welfare of all participants in the market. The market clearing
problem is decomposed into local subproblems, which can be
solved with limited information using the primal‐dual gradient
method. This maintains the privacy of participants and, by each
participant solving their own welfare maximisation problem,
the social welfare of the entire market can also be maximised.
EVs can also utilise P2P networks for the trading of en-
ergy. EVs with surplus energy in their batteries can sell energy
directly to other EVs that require charging (V2V) [21,22]. The
energy stored in EV batteries can also be sold to the grid
(V2G), for instance in [23] EVs act as either buyers or sellers of
energy with the grid, with the aim of regulating voltage de-
viations. The EVs submit both bids and asks, with an
auctioneer choosing which offer to accept. Most relevant to
this study is P2P EV charging, where EVs can purchase energy
to charge their batteries directly from energy producers. Smart
charging of EVs is considered in [24], where contracts are
negotiated between EVs and aggregators to coordinate EV
charging in a way that is beneficial to the grid. The aggregator
attempts to maximise profits and, with the cost set as a
function of the base load, it also results in flattening of the total
grid load. A multi‐agent system is proposed in [13], where
buyers and sellers can negotiate temporary contracts for the
sale and purchase of energy, including the ability to renegotiate
the price.
Auctions are a popular method of facilitating P2P energy
trading, as they give prosumers the ability to set their desired
bid and ask prices, quantity of energy traded and participation.
The Vickrey sealed bid mechanism [25,26] can facilitate
truthful bids, as the highest bidder wins the auction but pays
second highest bid price. A common auction structure is the
double auction where buyers and sellers submit bid and ask
prices, respectively [9,12,14,21,22,26,27]. The submitted bids
and asks can be used to form demand and supply curves based
on price and quantity. The intersection point of these curves
determines the quantity sold and the market clearing price
[9,22]. Buyers and sellers are typically matched according to
price, where the highest bidder trades with the seller with the
lowest ask [12,14]. An adaptation on this is considered in [11],
where the difference between bid prices and market price is
calculated, with the smaller the difference the higher the pri-
ority to trade. This rewards buyers who bid truthfully at market
price. There are also other mechanisms for matching buyers
and sellers: the authors of [21] determine trades through a
combination of cost and the percentage of EV's energy need
fulfilled, whereas [27] use a day‐ahead auction with the goal of
minimising impact on the grid through charging and dis-
charging EVs. An Average Price Mechanism is compared with
trading at the market clearing price in [26], where the authors
conclude that the Average Price Mechanism allows more par-
ticipants to trade. The authors of [28] consider auction
matching mechanisms for P2P energy trading among EVs
(V2V). They focus on a cloud‐based server for communication
between EVs, and consider the amount of energy each EV has
initially when determining the matching through a value known
as the aspiration rate. The auction matching mechanism aims
for greater profit for all participants, and the matching of EVs
is found to be optimal if the sum of the gain (difference be-
tween bid and asks) is maximised.
P2P trading of surplus solar energy is covered in [10,25,29].
The price of the solar energy in [10,25] is calculated from the
supply and demand ratio (SDR) in the energy market. The
uncertainty in solar production is considered in [29]. PV
owners make asks as they attempt to sell their surplus energy.
The market mechanism aims to maximise the PV revenue,
taking into account the revenue from energy sold, positive
deviation sold and reducing the costs of negative deviation.
The PV offers are ranked low to high, and loads are matched
with PV owners until there is no unmatched load remaining.
In many of these energy auctions, a seller is able to provide
energy to multiple buyers, or a buyer is able to purchase energy
from multiple sellers, simultaneously. However, in certain
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trading circumstances, the resources available do not cater to
this. For instance, [30] deals with the limited availability of on‐
street charging for EVs through incentivising cooperative
handovers to encourage better utilisation of charging points.
The limited availability of parking spaces is also considered in
[31,32]. Both use auction mechanisms with a limitation on the
number of winners to match the available resources (number
of parking spots and charge points). In [32,33] the amount of
energy available to a buyer is also limited. The energy available
to each buyer is determined by the total energy available minus
the amount requested by buyers offering a higher bid price. A
blockchain‐based auction system is presented in [25], where
sellers offer a block of energy for sale via a blockchain plat-
form. The highest bid wins the block of energy, matching a
trade for the respective buyer and seller. In these works, the
priority of obtaining the desired resource is based upon the bid
price, with a higher bid price increasing the likelihood of
trading the desired quantity of the resource.
2 | NOVEL CONTRIBUTION
Herein, a scenario is considered where a household or small‐
business, etc. (hereafter referred to as a household), wishes to
sell surplus solar energy produced by their solar PV panels to a
visiting EV that requires charging. It is assumed that the
household owns their own EV and has a vacant EV charging
point during the day. A double auction platform is considered
where households can submit asks to sell their surplus solar
energy and visiting EVs can submit bids to purchase this en-
ergy. In the auction, the winning households will provide the
winning EVs with a guaranteed parking space, EV charging
point and the agreed amount of solar energy in exchange for
the price determined from the bid and ask prices. Each EV can
only trade with a single household as it is assumed that an EV
would not want to relocate during the day, and as a household
only has a single charging point, each household can only
charge one EV at any given time. In line with existing work,
our auction ensures that participants are no worse off through
participation in the auction, and buyers and sellers are free to
individually determine their own bid and ask prices based on
their own preferences. The primary contributions of this work
are as follows:
1. Unlike many existing pieces of work that assume that there
is sufficient energy to ensure all EVs are able to fully charge,
our study examines the scenario where there may be
insufficient energy to complete all EV charging demands,
and explores auction matching mechanisms that aim to
maximise the amount of charge all EVs receive.
2. Electricity produced by household solar panels is fed
directly to the household's charge point to charge the EV,
rather than sold and distributed through the grid. This re-
duces system complexity and power issues resulting from
the charging of EVs or injection of DER‐produced energy.
It also ensures that the study is relevant and valid, as it can
be implemented in real life with existing technologies. By
focusing on increasing the EV charge, and hence the
amount of solar energy consumed, important environ-
mental challenges are tackled, aiding in the process of
decarbonisation.
3. One‐to‐one matching of EVs and households is enforced
to explore the effectiveness of different auction mecha-
nisms for EV energy auctions under the scenario of limited
solar energy and imperfect online information regarding the
future needs of EVs. One‐to‐one matching is chosen
because most households have only a single EV charge
point, meaning they can charge only one EV at a time, and
in addition, household PV arrays may not generate suffi-
cient energy to fully charge one EV, and are unlikely to have
sufficient surplus solar energy to trade with multiple EVs.
The procedure used and findings of this work regarding the
one‐to‐one matching of households and EVs could also be
extended to other scenarios that can only facilitate one‐to‐
one matchings.
4. A novel double auction mechanism, Closest Energy
Matching (CEM), is proposed, which aims to maximise the
amount of charge EVs receive from solar energy, reduce the
grid energy required for charging, reduce the EV's cost to
charge and increase the profit made by sellers. The pro-
posed CEM mechanism is described along with four other
mechanisms in Section 3.
5. A novel algorithm, MARMES (MAtrix Ranking for Max-
imising Element Selection), is presented in Section 4 to
solve the optimisation problem that forms the basis of the
CEM mechanism. Section 5 explains the case study used
and the performance results for each of the presented
auction mechanisms, showing that the CEM mechanism
results in higher solar consumption, greater EV charge,
increased revenue for households, lower costs for EVs and
a significant reduction in grid energy required to fully
charge all EVs.
3 | DOUBLE AUCTION MATCHING
MECHANISMS
The auction mechanisms presented here are based on the
double auction premise: buyers submit a bid consisting of the
price in p/kWh (1p = £0.01) that they are willing to pay for the
energy, along with their departure time and amount of energy
requested in kWh; sellers submit an ask price in p/kWh and
their predicted surplus energy available to sell throughout the
day. The purpose of the auction matching mechanism is to
match bids with asks to determine which buyers and sellers
trade together. The mechanism should satisfy individual ra-
tionality (the participants are no worse off through participa-
tion in the auction), achieve a strong balanced budget (the
auctioneer neither gains nor loses money as a result of a
matching), and attempt to satisfy economic efficiency (maxi-
mise total social welfare) [34]. A major factor of the auction
used in this scenario is that each buyer wishes to acquire a
certain quantity of energy and each seller has a different
amount of finite energy available. In addition, each buyer
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(seller) is only able to trade with a single seller(buyer). As a
result, the sellers are non‐homogeneous—the choice of seller
affects both trade price and energy quantity—so the auction
mechanism must take both price and energy quantity into ac-
count during the matching.
In all of the tested mechanisms, the auction runs every
15 min. If the EV owner requires energy and is not already
charging, they will submit their bid price and quantity of energy
required. Similarly, if the household has surplus energy avail-
able and is not currently charging another EV, they can submit
an ask price and their predicted surplus energy profile. Privacy
issues are an important consideration with P2P trading systems
for EVs. Buyers and sellers must submit private information
relating to their energy demand and supply profiles, EV energy
needs and driving patterns. The auction mechanisms presented
here utilise a sealed‐bid system, where the private information
regarding the EVs and households (energy profiles, departure
times) is only visible to the auctioneer that conducts the
matching mechanism. In addition, each buyer and seller are
identified by a unique ID number which preserves privacy
during the auction process. Once the auction matching process
is complete, the private information of a household's location
or EV information can be communicated directly with the
matched buyer and seller, respectively. Although not within the
scope of this work, the auction mechanism can be combined
with a blockchain implementation, such as in [14,21,35].
Public‐key encryption and the blockchain consensus procedure
are used in [14] to validate transactions and discard any
transactions created by dishonest partners within the network.
Smart contracts are also used to deal with discrepancies be-
tween energy awarded in the auction and energy actually
traded. A consortium blockchain is used in [21] to allow
permitted aggregators to verify the energy trades. Public/pri-
vate key encryption is again used to mask real identities and
ensure all messages and transactions are legitimate. The au-
thors of [35] present a privacy‐preserving algorithm through
the encryption of bids, with matching taking place over the
blockchain through a smart contract and the masking of the
identities of participants.
PV production and the household's energy requirement are
assumed to be predictable, and therefore the household is able
to broadcast their profile of surplus solar energy over the day
to all buyers. A further assumption is that an EV owner would
not wish to move their EV during the day. Therefore, a buyer
can only match with at most one seller, regardless of whether
or not that seller is able to provide sufficient energy to fully
charge the EV. Most households only have a single EV
charging point so, until an EV departs from a seller, no other
EVs can be charged. If a seller has insufficient solar energy
production to meet the EV's demand, grid energy can be used
to make up the shortfall.
3.1 | Determining the bid and ask price
Each buyer and seller has their own private valuation of the
energy, which is the equivalent of the highest price they are
willing to pay per kWh (denoted vi) or lowest price they are
willing to receive (vj), respectively. This valuation is known
only to the individual participant and is determined indi-
vidually through a variety of factors. A buyer who requires a
large quantity of energy may value it more highly than a
buyer who requires less energy, but the valuation is also a
factor of their own personal and economic situation—if the
buyer has other EV charging alternatives they would likely
the value energy lower than a buyer who relies heavily on
the energy they are bidding for. Likewise, a seller with a
large quantity of energy may value it lower than a seller with
less energy to sell. However, if battery storage is available to
them, they may prefer to store the energy rather than sell it
and would therefore value the energy they sell in the auction
more highly.
It is logical for a buyer to wish to trade at a price
considerably lower than their valuation and a seller to wish to
trade at a price higher than their valuation. The gain that a
buyer receives from the auction matching is defined as the
difference between their valuation and the price they pay for
the energy, and the gain a seller receives is the difference be-
tween the price they receive for the energy and their private
valuation [22,36]. If buyers bid lower than their true valuation
they risk not receiving the full amount of energy they request if
the only seller with sufficient energy has an ask price
πbidi < πaskj < vi. However, because sellers are free to set their
own ask price, and the award of energy through the auction
mechanisms considered here is not directly proportional to the
bid price, it is an appropriate assumption for the buyer and
seller to choose their optimal bid and ask prices solely based on
their expected gain per kWh.
If a buyer and seller are matched by the auction mechanism
with bid and ask prices of πbidi and πaskj and trade at price
πtradeij ¼ 12 πbidi þ πaskj
� �
, then the gain the buyer receives is
given by
Gi ¼ vi −
1
2
⋅ πbidi þ πaskj
� �
ð1Þ
The maximum gain that a buyer can receive is
Gmaxi ¼ vi − vj ð2Þ
which occurs when vj ¼ πaskj and πbidi ¼ vj , that is, when the
seller asks for their true value and the buyer bids the same
value.
If both parties bid truthfully—πbidi ¼ vi and πaskj ¼ vj—
the gain the buyer receives is given by
Gi ¼ vi −
1
2








Therefore, the gain they have sacrificed between their
maximum possible gain and the gain from bidding truthfully is
given by
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The same is true in reverse for a seller, so a seller would ask
for more than their true value vj to try to increase their gain, in
the same way that a buyer could increase theirs by bidding
closer to the seller's true value. Therefore, πaskj > vj, and
Gmaxi < vi − vj. Therefore, bidding truthfully is not a domi-
nant strategy in the auction and, as such, the buyers and sellers
must choose their bid and ask prices in order to try and
maximise their gain. The optimal bid price for a buyer is
derived as follows:
The buyers do not know the sellers' ask prices or other bid
prices, hence the auction operates in sealed bid manner. It could
be assumed that the asks are normally distributed as it is likely
that participants will have past knowledge of the average trade
price [37]. The majority of bids/asks will be focused around the
average price,with fewer offers at prices further from the average
price. Herein, the past data have been estimated with μ = 11.5 p
and σ = 1. The buyer wishes to choose their bid price to maxi-
mise their gain against the expected ask price, but if they bid
lower than the ask price then they will receive 0 gain.
The expected gain that a buyer would expect to achieve






πbidi þ xð Þ
� �
⋅ f ðxÞ dx ð5Þ
where f(x) represents the normal distribution probability den-
sity function:













Figure 1 shows the value of the buyer's expected gain
calculated from solving (5) for a range of bid prices for three
different valuations (vi). It shows that the buyer can expect to
obtain a higher gain by bidding a value lower than their true
valuation, as expected from (4), but it also shows that their
expected gain decreases if they bid too low as the probability of
trading decreases. The optimal bid price ðπ�bidiÞ to maximise
the expected gain for each valuation is shown on the graph by
the dotted lines corresponding to the maximum value.
In order to maximise the expected gain, the buyer must
choose a bid price that maximises the value of Equation (5).
To simplify the calculation, this integral is approximated as a
Riemann sum using the midpoint rule, and the optimisation







mk þ πbidið Þ
� �









kΔxk − k − 1ð ÞΔxkð Þ þ k − 1ð ÞΔxk ð7bÞ
πbidi ≤ vi ð7cÞ
where n is the number of intervals, mk is the midpoint of
interval k in the integration and Δxk is the width of each in-
terval. Each buyer can calculate their optimal bid price π�bidi by
finding the value of πbidi that maximises the objective function
(7).
The derivation of the optimal ask price for a seller π�askj
� �
is not shown here, but it can be obtained using the same






mk þ πaskj − vj
� �� �









kΔxk − k − 1ð ÞΔxkð Þ þ k − 1ð ÞΔxk ð8bÞ
πaskj ≥ vj ð8cÞ
3.2 | Auction matching mechanisms
Five mechanisms are explored below, each with a different
strategy for matching buyers and sellers. The overall aims
of the buyers are to maximise the amount of charge they
receive for their EVs and reduce the cost, whereas sellers
wish to maximise the amount of their surplus energy sold
and increase their profit. In each mechanism, the trade
price is calculated as the mean of the matched bid and
ask prices, resulting in buyers always paying the bid price
or less, and sellers always receiving their ask price or
greater.
Mechanism 1 Cheapest ask
This is the classic double auction mechanism, as in [12,14].
Once buyers and sellers have submitted bids and asks, they are
ordered according to natural ordering—bids are sorted from
high‐to‐low, and asks from low‐to‐high. Each bid is taken in
this order and matched with the lowest available ask. The
corresponding household and EV are then matched and can
trade. This mechanism only considers the bid and ask prices
and not the amount of available energy.
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Mechanism 2 Sufficient energy/cheapest ask
Mechanism 2 is an adaptation of Mechanism 1. Because the
first mechanism only considers the prices and not the energy
requirements, it is possible that an EV will be matched to a
household that is unable to provide the desired quantity of en-
ergy, when theremaybe an alternate household that could supply
sufficient energy with little difference in price. This mechanism
makes the following adjustments to the algorithm used in
Mechanism 1: Once the bids and asks have been sorted, each bid
is taken in order. However, sellers that have insufficient energy to
meet the EV's energy need are first removed from the list of asks
before the cheapest ask remaining is matched. If there are no
sellers available with sufficient energy, then the mechanism picks
the cheapest ask, as per Mechanism 1. Mechanisms 1 and 2
reward buyers who have bid the most by giving them priority in
the matching, as in [32,33].
Mechanism 3 Minimise cost
This mechanism attempts to minimise the total cost to
buyers through solving the following optimisation problem.
Similar cost minimisation strategies are popular in energy




















Egridij ¼ Ereqi − Etradeij ð9bÞ
πtradeij ¼ πbidi þ πaskj
� �.
2 ð9cÞ
πbidi > πaskj ð9dÞ
xij 2 0; 1 ∀ i 2 f1 … Ig; ∀j 2 f1 … Jg ð9eÞ
X
xi ≤ 1 ∀ i 2 f1 … Ig ð9fÞ
X
xj ≤ 1 ∀ j 2 f1 … Jg ð9gÞ
where I, J are the number of buyers and sellers, respectively,
πtradeij is the agreed trade price, Etradeij is the amount of solar
energy traded, πgrid is the price to purchase energy from the
grid, Egridij is the amount of energy that must be purchased
from the grid to ensure EV i receives a full charge if trading
with seller j. TDi and Ereqi are the departure time of, and
amount of energy required by EV i, respectively. Etavj is the
amount of surplus energy seller j available at time t, and
πbidi;πaskj are the bid and ask prices of the buyer i and the
seller j, respectively. The decision variable is X—a matrix with I
rows and J columns, and xij is the value of X at position (i, j),
where xij = 1 if buyer i trades with seller j, or else equals 0.
Constraints (9e), (9f) and (9g) ensure that matrix X contains
only 0s and 1s and has at most a single 1 in every row and
column.
The problem considers both the cost to a buyer of pur-
chasing solar energy from a seller and also the cost of any
additional energy that would be needed from the grid to enable
the EV to depart with its required energy. If buyer i's bid price
is not greater than seller j's ask price, they are unable to trade
and xij = 0.
By attempting to minimise the total cost, the mechanism
encourages trading of renewable energy, as it is assumed that
F I GURE 1 Effect of bid price on buyer gain for
three different values of buyer valuation vi
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πtradeij < πgrid. This increases the quantity of surplus energy
sold, and thus the amount of charge received by the EVs,
whilst also reducing the cost to the consumer.
Mechanism 4 Buyer/seller utility
To ensure that the auction mechanism is beneficial to both
buyers and sellers, Mechanism 4 considers the satisfaction of
both buyers and sellers through a quantity known as the
buyer's or seller's utility, which has been based on the work in
[21]. A good matching for a buyer meets the following criteria:
� Low cost—a buyer wishes to pay as little as possible for the
energy
� High charge—a buyer wishes to receive all of their required
energy
Whereas, sellers aim for:
� Maximised income—a seller prefers to sell surplus energy at
a higher price, as this increases their income
� High energy utilisation—a seller aims to sell as much sur-
plus energy as they can
Despite each buyer and seller having two aims there is
inherent equivalence, allowing them to be expressed as a single
aim for a buyer and for a seller. Buyers wish to increase the
amount of charge received and by doing so will also help the
seller's aim of increasing the amount of solar energy sold.
Introducing the term ‘cost benefit' allows the second point for
each participant to also be met [22, 32, 33]. The cost benefits
for buyer i and seller j trading are defined as the difference
between the trade price and the bid or ask price, respectively, as
given in (10) and (11):
Bbuyij ¼ πbidi − πtradeij ð10Þ
Bsellji ¼ πtradeij − πaskj ð11Þ
Bbuyij ¼ Bsellji ð12Þ
Whilst similar, it is important to note the differences be-
tween the cost benefit ðBbuyijÞ here, and the gain (Gi) used in
the calculation of the optimal bid and ask prices earlier in this
section. The cost benefit is the difference between the bid price
and trade price, whereas the gain is the difference between the
buyer's private valuation and the trade price, such that
Gi ≥ ðBbuyijÞ. As the trade price is equal to the mean of the
matched bid and ask prices, (12) always holds. Therefore,
increasing either the buyer or seller cost benefit also results in
an increase to the other. As a result, all aims for buyers and
sellers can be realised through the buyer and seller utility ex-
pressions in (13) and (14), respectively:




Usji ¼ |πtradeji − πaskj| ð14Þ
where w is a unitless constant. The use of subscript ij denotes
the value from buyer i's point of view, and subscript ji is a
value from seller j's view. For instance Bbuyij is the benefit buyer
i receives if trading with seller j, whereas Bsellji is the benefit
seller j receives if trading with buyer i. The total utility of buyer
i trading with seller j is
UTij ¼Ubij þUsji ð15Þ
The utility that would be achieved for every combination
of buyer and seller trading can be calculated using the infor-
mation submitted with the bids and asks at every time step. If a
buyer and seller cannot trade, that is they are already partaking
in a different trade, or the buyer's bid does not exceed the
seller's ask, the total utility for that combination can be set to
−∞. Mechanism 4 matches buyers and sellers by solving
optimisation problem (16) to maximise the total utility. The
optimisation outputs matrix X which contains a 1 at position (i,
j) if buyer and seller i and j should trade, or 0 otherwise. This is
very similar to the approach used in [28], however, there it is
assumed that the EVs will reach a full charge so the matching






UTij ⋅ xij ð16Þ
s:t: eqs:ð9dÞtoð9gÞ ð16aÞ
xij ⋅ UTij ≥ 0 ∀ i 2 f1 … Ig; ∀j 2 f1 … Jg ð16bÞ
Mechanism 5 Closest Energy Matching
A disadvantage of Mechanisms 3 and 4 can be demon-
strated through the following simple example:
There are two households selling energy and two EVs
wishing to charge, arriving at different times: Household A has
a total of 20 kWh of energy available to trade and asks for 11
p/kWh, and Household B can offer a total of 50 kWh at a price
of 10 p/kWh. EV 1 arrives at 11 AM, requiring 15 kWh with a
bid price of 12 p/kWh. Under mechanisms 3 and 4, EV 1
would trade with Household B. However, if EV 2 then arrives
an hour later at 12 PM, requiring 30 kWh and offering the
same price, Household A is its only option to trade, resulting in
EV 2 not receiving a full charge. It should be apparent that if
EV 1 had instead matched with Household A, then EV 2
would be able to trade with Household B, resulting in both EVs
receiving a full charge.
The concept of CEM attempts to rectify this problem by
matching each buyer with the seller whose available surplus
energy is closest to the amount requested by the buyer. In this
context, the seller j with the closest available energy to buyer i
is the seller for whom their total available surplus energy minus
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the buyer's requested energy results in a positive value closest








A ∀ Etavj > Ereqi ð17Þ
If there are no sellers for which this calculation results in a
positive value, the seller with the closest energy is the one









The energy difference is weighted with the constant w in
(19a) or (19b) depending on whether the energy difference is
positive or negative. This weighting ensures that the energy
difference has the greatest contribution to the optimisation
function. Two other terms are included in the optimisation
(19): the proportion of the EV's energy that can be supplied
from charging with each household and the cost benefit (10)
achieved by participants. This ensures that the aims of both
buyers and sellers are represented and result in a better
outcome for all parties. The CEM mechanism matches buyers
and sellers so that their energy difference is minimised, and the
energy purchased/sold and cost benefit are maximised.
Matching buyers and sellers by minimising the difference be-
tween the buyer's need and seller's surplus energy should result
in a matching that not only meets the buyer's energy needs but
also considers potential future EV charging requests as it keeps
households with greater available surplus energy in reserve for
the event that an EV with a greater energy requirement arrives.







EDij þ EAij þ Bbuyij
� �
⋅ xij ð19Þ
where EDij ¼ w ⋅
1
Ediff ij




















Etavj − Ereqi ð19dÞ
s:t: eqs:ð9dÞtoð9gÞ ð19eÞ
where EDij is a function of Ediff ij: the difference between seller
j's available energy and buyer i's required energy; EAij is the
proportion of buyer i's energy need that can be satisfied by
seller j, and w, a are unitless constants.
4 | SOLVING THE MECHANISM
OPTIMISATION PROBLEMS
4.1 | MARMES
The optimisation problems in Mechanisms 3–5 are from the
class of integer linear programming problems, as the optimi-
sation variable, X, only contains zeros and ones. The problem
being solved is to place ones in the matrix X to maximise the
sum of the elements in U* = X ⋅ U, where U is a matrix
containing the utility values from Mechanism 4, the inverse of
the cost function in (9), or the energy difference function from
(19), calculated for each combination of buyer i and seller j. U*
is a matrix containing the chosen elements from U. The
constraints (9f) and (9g) enforce that matrix X can contain at
most one 1 in any row or column as each EV is only able to
trade with a single household and each household can only
trade with a single EV, all other values must be 0.






Amn ⋅ xmn ð20Þ
s:t: Amn 2 R ∀ m 2 f1 … Mg; ∀n 2 f1 … Ng ð20aÞ
xmn 2 0; 1 ∀ m 2 f1 … Mg; ∀n 2 f1 … Ng ð20bÞ
X
xm ≤ 1 ∀ m 2 f1 … Mg ð20cÞ
X
xn ≤ 1 ∀ n 2 f1 … Ng ð20dÞ
where A is a M � N matrix containing a set of real numbers
and X is a matrix of equal size to A containing the output from
the maximisation. MATLAB supports the solving of this type
of problem through its 'intlinprog' solver, however a new al-
gorithm named MARMES (MAtrix Ranking for Maximising
Element Selection) specifically designed for solving this
problem is proposed here. MARMES solves the problem faster
than MATLAB's solver and does not rely on MATLAB
functionality, making it more appropriate for use in a real‐
world application.
Algorithm 1 MARMES Algorithm for maximising
the sum of chosen elements in a matrix
Input: A
Initialisation : iter ← 1, Aranked ←A, X
(iter)
← 0M,N
for m = 1 to M do
Replace numbers in row m of Aranked with
their rank, where highest number = 1,
lowest number = N
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Find location n of number with rank = 1 in
row m and put a 1 in corresponding location
m, n in X(iter)
end for
while there exists a column n whereP
xðiterÞn > 1
iter ← iter + 1, X(iter) = X(iter−1)




Ωm ← m where x
ðiterÞ
m;n ¼ 1
for m 2Ωm do
R ← rank value from location m, n in
Aranked
if Arankedmn > 1 (Current rank > 1) then
if columns containing higher ranked
values in row m are empty in matrix
X(iter)
Move 1 in xðiterÞm from current





Calculate Adiffm ¼ Amn − Amn� where n* is
the column containing rank R + 1 in row
m of Aranked
end for
Adiffmax← row index in Ωm corresponding to
the greatest Adiff
for Each row in Ωm, except Adiffmax do
if Higher rank value not allocated in
line 15 then
Move 1 in X(iter) from current
position in row to position







The MARMES algorithm begins by ranking numbers in
each row of the matrix A, with the highest number given the
rank 1, the second highest rank 2, etc. Once all numbers have
been ranked, it begins by selecting the highest number
(rank = 1) in each row, by placing a 1 in the corresponding field
in matrix X. Given that there can be, at most, one 1 in each
column, the columns that contain more than one 1 are found.
While there are any columns that contain more than a single 1,
the following is repeated: for each of these columns (denoted
by set Ωn), the rows that contain the 1s are found (set Ωm). In
each of these rows the algorithm looks to see if the location of
1 in that row of X corresponds to the highest rank (1). If not, it
then checks to see if the higher ranked values in that row fall in
columns of X that contain all zeros. If so, the location of the 1
in that row of X is moved from the current column to the
empty column corresponding to the highest rank. If this is not
possible, the difference between the values of the number in A
in the current rank (position currently selected by 1), and the
number in the next highest rank is calculated (Adiffm2Ωm). The
row from set Ωm containing the greatest difference is left
unchanged, and in all other rows from this set, the location of
the 1 in matrix X is moved to the position corresponding to
the next highest rank. If there are still columns containing
more than a single 1, then the iteration number increases and
the algorithm repeats. Once a solution has been found that
results in at most a single 1 in each row and column, the al-
gorithm stops and outputs the current iteration of X. The
locations of 1s in this matrix show the chosen values that
maximise the sum of A, subject to the imposed constraints.
The algorithm does not place a 1 in every row if there is no
feasible solution—if there is no next highest rank available in
line 23 of the algorithm, then this row would be left blank
instead. If A contains negative numbers or other unwanted
values, then these can be ignored by adjusting the ranking
criteria in line 3, for example by only ranking positive numbers.
The performance of this algorithm is measured against that
of the intlinprog solver in MATLAB, which is assumed to be
reliable in providing the optimum selection of values resulting
in the highest possible total sum. The algorithm is compared
with MATLAB's solver through computation time—the time
taken to find the optimum selection of values, and the solution
accuracy—the ratio of the sum of values achieved by the
proposed algorithm, with the true maximum value. To evaluate
the performance, 1000 repeats are taken using a 50 � 50
matrix filled with a random selection of numbers between 1
and 20 for input A. The accuracy and the average time (ms) to
compute the solution with each algorithm is shown in Table 1.
The proposed algorithm solves the problem on average
93.5% faster than MATLAB's intlinprog solver, whilst main-
taining an average accuracy of 99.4%. For reference, an average
accuracy of 100% would mean that the proposed algorithm
reaches the exact same solution as MATLAB's solver on every
repeat. As it is assumed that MATLAB's solver provides the
optimum solution, it is not possible to exceed an accuracy of
100%. Because of the success of this algorithm in reducing
computation time without sacrificing result, this algorithm is
used in the CEM mechanism to compute the optimal matching
of buyers and sellers.
4.2 | One‐to‐one matching versus many‐to‐
many matching
A one‐to‐one auction matching mechanism is proposed, where
each buyer is only able to match with a single seller and vice
TABLE 1 ILP solver algorithm comparison
Trade with Grid Mechanism 5
Computation time (ms) 22.73 1.46
Avg. accuracy 100% 99.4%
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versa. One‐to‐one matching has been chosen as the most
suitable auction type in our scenario for the following reasons.
First, such a system can be easily implemented with existing
hardware and technology, and is less computationally complex
than a many‐to‐many matching system, making it more
appropriate for use within the low‐powered hardware as may
be used in an EV charging point. Secondly, it enables the
household's charge point and solar panels to be isolated from
the grid, enabling EV charging and use of DERs without
concerns around transformer load and line voltage deviation
issues. Thirdly, EV energy requirements are high in comparison
with the energy generated from domestic PV panels. A single
household is unlikely to have sufficient surplus solar energy to
charge multiple EVs and most households only have a single
charge point, so trading amongst multiple households and EVs
is not greatly beneficial in the scenario considered here. By
enforcing one‐to‐one matching, the auction mechanism must
determine which household should charge each EV to ensure
best consumption of household solar energy and EVs
achieving the greatest percentage of their required energy,
without any information about future demand.
Alternatively, many current studies consider many‐to‐many
matching, where each household can charge multiple EVs, and
each EV can purchase energy from multiple households
[7,13,21,27]. In certain scenarios, such a system could result in
greater utilisation of renewable energy, or cheaper prices for
consumers. Although this is beyond the scope of this study, it
is possible to adapt the MARMES algorithm presented in the
previous section to conduct many‐to‐many matching auctions.
The auction can be conducted in two rounds, with the first
round using MARMES and CEM to match each EV with a
household where the EV can park and charge. The second
round would be an energy‐only round where, if an EV is un-
able to fulfil its charging requirements from the household that
it has been matched with in the first round, it can make an
energy bid to other households for its energy shortfall. If a
household has additional surplus energy not already promised
to a charging EV, they can submit an energy ask to sell this
energy to another EV through the grid. This requires another
round of communication to the auction and is therefore more
computationally complex, but could result in more EVs
achieving a full charge and households selling more of their
surplus solar energy. However, if a household that is not
charging an EV opts to sell energy in the second round, it
could reduce the chance of that household winning a more
profitable future first‐round auction, as it has already
committed some of its energy. A comparison between the two
auction types is beyond the scope of this work.
5 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
5.1 | Case study
The case study centres around the simulation of a 24‐h period,
beginning and ending at midnight, using the parameters in
Table 2. Eighty EVs randomly arrive between 6 AM and 2 PM
and will make a request for the energy they require to fully
recharge, a randomly selected value between 3 and 30 kWh.
The EV will also announce its planned departure time, which
will be no sooner than the earliest time that the EV could
receive all of its required energy at the standard home charging
rate of 7.2 kW. There are eighty households equipped with EV
charging points and rooftop solar PV panels ranging between 5
and 20 kWp capacity. Households can sell their surplus solar
energy (the difference between generation and the household's
baseload consumption) to visiting EV drivers who require
charging. The EVs can park at the household and use their
charging point to recharge with the surplus solar energy. The
information about EV arrivals/departures and energy needs
are considered ‘online' information, and are therefore not
known ahead of their arrival.
If there are EVs that need to charge, prior to the
auction each EV will each submit a bid consisting of their
energy requirement, departure time and bid price. If a
household is not currently charging an EV and has surplus
solar energy available to trade, they can broadcast their
available surplus energy profile for the day with an ask price
they want to receive for their energy. It is assumed that a
household can predict its solar energy generation and
baseload consumption on a daily basis, but the procedure
for this prediction is beyond the scope of this study. The
amount of energy that a household has available for trading
is the minimum of either the available surplus solar energy,
or the amount of energy that can be charged at a rate of
7.2 kW (maximum EV charger rate).
The energy trading auction takes place every 15 min using
the EV bids and household asks that have been submitted in
the prior quarter hour. The auction mechanism under study is
used to match the bids and asks to determine which EVs and
households trade, and therefore where the EVs will go to park
and charge. Once a household and EV have matched, the
household will feed its surplus solar energy generated by its PV
panels directly to its EV charge point, allowing the visiting EV
to charge. Whilst the EV is parked at the household, the
household is unable to partake in any further trades as its
charging point is occupied.
It is assumed that EVs will account for the charging effi-
ciency during the trade—for instance if they require 18 kWh to
TABLE 2 Simulation parameters
No. of EVs/households 80/80
EV energy required 3–30 kWh (random)
Arrival times 6 AM–2 PM (random distribution)
Departure times Sufficient to fully charge EV at 7.2 kW
Solar PV size (kWp) 5 (40%), 7 (20%), 10 (30%), 20 (10%)
Available solar energy Expected PV data for 1st May [39]
Grid energy cost 14.37 p/kWh [40]
Charging efficiency 90%
Abbreviations: EV, electric vehicle; PV, photovoltaic.
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fully recharge and the charging efficiency is 90%, then the EV
will request 20 kWh.
As there is significant inherent variation in the selection of
the random parameters, the simulation is repeated 1000 times
for each of the five auction mechanisms studied here. This
ensures accuracy and reliability in the results and enables
comparisons between the five mechanisms to be made unaf-
fected by the randomness of the simulation parameters.
The described case study is shown schematically in
Figure 2. It displays the process of households submitting asks
containing their surplus solar energy profile and EVs submit-
ting their bid prices and energy requirements to the auction
system, and the outcome of the matching algorithm confirm-
ing which household and EVs are matched.
5.2 | Results
In an EV charging scenario, the amount of charge received by
the EVs is of primary importance, as it is necessary to ensure
that EVs receive sufficient charge to meet their energy needs
for subsequent journeys. Increasing the amount of charge EVs
receive from the solar energy can reduce the cost to the buyer,
increase seller profits, assist with decarbonisation objectives
and reduce the load on the grid, enabling a higher penetration
of EVs to charge. It also enables communities to become more
self‐reliant, as is necessary in the case of islanded microgrids,
by reducing the amount of additional energy that must be
imported. Increasing the consumption of the solar energy is an
incentive for further investment in new renewable energy
sources and expands capacity for further DER integration and
decarbonisation in the grid. However, it should be acknowl-
edged that given the relative size of EV batteries to domestic
PV installations, there is unlikely to be sufficient surplus energy
produced by a single household to fully meet the needs of an
EV. Therefore, it is important that the auction matching
mechanism can make optimal usage of the available solar en-
ergy to ensure that EVs are allocated to charge in the most
efficient way.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the percentage of the
EV's requested charge that has been fulfilled from solar energy
by their departure, for all five auction mechanisms. Each bar in
a group of 6 represents a range of EV state of charge (SoC) at
departure, and the height of the bar signifies the percentage of





Table 3 displays the average charge achieved by EVs with
each mechanism and the final three columns display the per-
centage of EVs departing with SoC specified by the three
criteria. The percentage of EVs departing with less than 20%
of requested charge is low for all five mechanisms (max 0.4%
—Mechanism 2). The mechanisms based on the standard
double auction mechanism (1 and 2) result in lower SoCs than
are achieved through other mechanisms: 15.2% of EVs depart
with 50% or less of their requested energy with Mechanism 1,
whereas Mechanisms 3–5 see a significant improvement, with
7.5% of EVs departing with 50% or less with Mechanism 3,
and just 3.7% with CEM (Mechanism 5). Mechanisms 3 and 4
both perform similarly; however, there are clear improvements
with the proposed CEM mechanism. There is a 16%
improvement in the number of EVs that depart with full
charge compared with Mechanisms 2–4, with all other depar-
ture charge ranges seeing a decrease in the percentage of EVs
departing with that range of charge. Only 13.4% of EVs depart
with less than 90% of their requested charge, compared with
over 20% of EVs using any of the other four mechanisms. The
CEM mechanism also results in the highest average charge at
departure, with EVs departing with on average 94.8% of their
requested energy, with Mechanism 4 achieving the next highest
average charge of 91.4%.
Figure 4 quantifies the amount of grid energy that is
required to fully charge all EVs in each mechanism. Despite
there only being a 3% difference between the mean charge
from solar energy of Mechanisms 3–5, this equates to a 36%
reduction in required grid energy between Mechanisms 4 and
5, and a 71.4% reduction in grid energy between Mechanism 1
and the CEM mechanism. This means that the proposed
CEM mechanism can reduce the load on the grid by over one‐
third, essential to increasing the penetration of EVs within
existing grid limits. Because Mechanism 5 is designed to pri-
oritise the charge received over cost benefit, it does result in
higher trade prices (Figure 5), and therefore lower buyer/seller
cost benefit.
A higher trade price would appear to be more advanta-
geous to sellers as selling surplus energy at a higher price will
increase their profit, but would be detrimental to buyers as it
means that they pay more per kWh than under a different
mechanism. However, if it is assumed that the buyers would
purchase the additional energy they require to ensure full EV
charge by departure at grid prices, then the total cost incurred
to buyers is not just the cost of buying the surplus solar energy
from the household but also the additional cost of the grid
energy. Figure 6 shows the average cost per buyer and average
profit per seller for each of the auction mechanisms. Mecha-
nisms 3–5 result in a very similar average cost per buyer, with
the CEM mechanism resulting in just 0.6% lower costs than
Mechanism 3, and is only 7.9 pence (4.3%) cheaper than the
most expensive mechanism (Mechanism 1). Despite the high-
est trade price, Mechanism 5 results in the lowest cost per
buyer because of the significant reduction in required grid
energy. Similarly, Mechanism 1 provides the lowest trade price,
and greatest cost benefit, but results in higher costs to buyers
and lower seller profits because of the lower solar energy
consumption and subsequent increase in grid energy. Mecha-
nisms 3 and 4 are a clear improvement over the first two
mechanisms for seller profit, both averaging around 21 pence
greater profit than Mechanism 1. Again, the CEM mechanism
provides the greatest profit for sellers, with a 31.6 pence
(24.4%) improvement over Mechanism 1, and a 10.2 pence
improvement over Mechanisms 3 and 4.
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The average buyer cost and seller profit using CEM
(Mechanism 5) are compared with a household that does not
partake in P2P trading in Table 4. Instead of selling energy to
other EVs, the household instead sells all produced solar en-
ergy to the grid at SEG price, and the EV must purchase all
required energy at grid price. To make this a fair comparison,
the household partaking in P2P trading is also able to sell its
un‐traded solar energy to the grid at SEG price, resulting in a
seller profit greater than displayed in Figure 6.
As the trade price is much lower than the standard grid
electricity rate, the cost to a buyer using P2P trading with the
CEM mechanism is around 24% lower on average than if
purchasing energy directly from the grid. In addition, the price
received through exporting energy to the grid through the
SEG is significantly lower than can be obtained through P2P
trading, with sellers able to achieve a 132% increase in income
if using the CEM mechanism and P2P trading. To ensure
fairness amongst sellers, the number of sellers selected by the
F I GURE 2 Schematic representation of the case study
F I GURE 3 Grid energy required at each repeat to satisfy all electric vehicle charging requests
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mechanism to trade must also be considered. Despite the fact
that there are the same number of sellers as buyers, and every
buyer is receiving charge, it is possible for a single seller to sell
to more than one buyer during the day, if the first buyer arrives
and departs early. As a result, not every seller is guaranteed to
sell energy through the auction. Mechanism 1 results in the
highest percentage of sellers trading, with a median value of 73
sellers, Mechanisms 2 and 5 have almost identical results with a
median of 71 sellers, and Mechanisms 3 and 4 are similar, with
a median of 70 sellers trading. The differences between these
results are too small for a conclusion that the choice of
mechanism significantly affects the likelihood of a seller
trading.
Figure 7 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis
exploring the impact of incorrect solar prediction and a
varying ratio of EVs to households on the mean solar
energy charge (mean SoC) of EVs. Whereas the previous
results have used equal numbers of EVs and households,
this figure shows how varying the ratio of the number of
EVs to households from 1:4 (20 EVs, 80 households) to 4:1
(80 EVs, 20 households) affects the mean SoC at departure.
In addition, the percentage error in solar energy prediction
is also varied to evaluate the robustness of the CEM
mechanism and its reliance on accurate solar predictions.
The solar energy is predicted by the households and this
prediction is used in the auction matching, however, the
actual solar energy that can be sold to the EV is varied
between 20% greater (+20%) and 20% lower (−20%) than
the prediction. Under‐predicting solar energy (percentage
error +5%–+20%) results in a very slight increase in the
mean departure charge (0.8%–4%); as although the addi-
tional solar energy theoretically enables the EVs to depart
with greater charge, the charge they can receive is limited by
the availability of households with sufficient energy to meet
every EV's requirement. If the solar energy is over‐predicted
by the household, and the actual solar energy that is traded
is less than declared by the household during the auction
process (percentage error: −5% to −20%), there is a greater
decrease in average charge. Over‐predicting solar energy by
20% results in a decrease in SoC of between 8% and 9%
compared with accurate solar predictions. This is not a huge
decrease however, and shows the CEM auction mechanism
to be fairly robust against deviations between predicted and
actual solar energy production. Decreasing the ratio of EVs
to households also results in slight increases in mean SoC as
there are more options for each EV, however, similarly to
TABLE 3 EV charge gained by departure
EV SoC EV SoC EV SoC
Mechanism Mean Charge (%) <50% <90% 100%
1 81.7 15.2% 42.9% 50.0%
2 85.8 17.2% 27.4% 72.6%
3 91.0 7.5% 21.6% 71.4%
4 91.4 7.0% 20.7% 72.4%
5 94.8 3.7% 13.4% 84.0%
Abbreviations: EV, electric vehicle; SoC, state of charge.
F I GURE 4 Grid energy required at each repeat to satisfy all electric vehicle charging requests
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under‐prediction of solar energy, there is a limit to the in-
crease in mean SoC as there are inevitably EVs with energy
requirements greater than can be fulfilled by household solar
energy. Increasing the number of EVs relative to the
number of households shows a more significant drop in the
mean SoC. A ratio of four EVs to three households still
F I GURE 5 Average trade price agreed under each mechanism
F I GURE 6 Average cost per buyer to fully charge EV, and average profit per seller with each auction mechanism
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results in a relatively high SoC (89.2% compared with
94.8%), likely because there will be enough EVs departing
fully charged early enough in the day to enable another EV
to charge at the same household after it leaves. However,
with double the number of EVs as households or above,
there is a significant reduction in the mean charge as there
are increasing numbers of EVs that are unable to trade with
any household as the demand greatly exceeds supply, and
depart with a SoC of 0%.
For the above results, the value of w in Mechanism 5
was chosen to be w = 5. A value of 5 was found to
maximise the amount of EV charge received from solar
energy, which is the purpose of this study. Decreasing the
value of w results in a lower trade price, thus a higher
buyer/seller benefit, but at the expense of reduced EV
charging. As additional grid energy is required in this
instance, there is no financial benefit to the buyer despite a
lower trade price. Increasing the value of w beyond 5 offers
no additional benefits.
6 | CONCLUSION
Herein, five different auction mechanisms are presented and
compared for matching buyers and sellers in a P2P energy
double auction. The specific scenario considered was where
households were able to utilise their vacant EV charge
points during the day to sell surplus solar energy produced
by the household's PV panels to the visiting EV owners. It
is in the interests of the EV owners to receive as much
energy from the surplus solar energy sold as possible and
reduce their costs to charge, and it is in the interests of the
sellers to sell as much surplus solar energy as they can, and
to receive the maximum amount of income. To help solve
the integer linear programming problem in the optimisation
stage of the auction mechanisms, a novel algorithm
‘MARMES’ is proposed. MARMES is benchmarked against
MATLAB's ‘intlinprog’ solver, and demonstrates an equiva-
lent level of accuracy, but with much faster computation
time, making it more suitable for use in a real‐world auction
application. The proposed CEM algorithm (Mechanism 5)
can be seen to offer the best performance of all the auction
mechanisms considered. It increases the percentage of EV
charging from solar energy by considering not only current
EV charge requests but also potential future demand,
benefiting both buyers and sellers. It therefore reduces the
amount of grid energy required, facilitating higher EV
F I GURE 7 Sensitivity analysis showing the effect of incorrect solar energy prediction and varying the ratio of EVs to households on the average solar
charge gained by EVs
TABLE 4 Financial benefit of P2P trading
Trade w/Grid Mechanism 5 % Improvement
Avg. cost per buyer 233 p 177 p 24.0%
Avg. seller profit 101.9 p 237 p 132.6%
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penetrations, reducing the total cost to buyers and increasing
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